Internationella AIDS-dagen

Nu är det ju inte så att jag missgillar the Killers, tvärtom; jag har alltid tyckt att de svänger sedan deras allra första platta Hot Fuss kom ut 2005 med hitten Somebody told me. Men dagens reportage om deras senaste platta på TV4 Nyheterna’s 19-sändning gjorde mig extremt illa till mods. Kanske förstärktes mina känslor av TV4:s Nyhetsmorgon-sändning som jag råkade slå på medans jag åt frukost i morse. Jag skall berätta varför.

Idag är det den Internationella AIDS-dagen. Nyhetsmorgon hade tagit dit vår biståndsminister, en representant från Läkare Utan Gränser samt en svensk som är FN:s sändebud i AIDS-frågor. Representanten från Läkare Utan Gränser var riktigt vettig. Det lilla hon hann med att få sagt var riktigt bra – hon tryckte t.ex. på att det inte finns lika bra bromsmediciner för barn, eftersom forskning på detta område inte har prioriteras i västvärlden då de flest sjuka barn lever i utvecklingsländerna. Och bara det måste ju förhoppnignsvis gett flera tittare en tankeställare.

När det svenska FN-sändebudet fick komma till tals så lät det som om han beklagade sig på utvecklingsländernas kapacitet att hantera AIDS-problematiken. Han kanske inte menade det så (för då skulle jag verkligen bli förvånad!) men han verkade lite arg på att dessa länder inte hade tillsatt fler resurser på att bekämpa AIDS, när de visste vilka mål de skulle behöva nå till 2010 eller om det var 2015. Biståndsministern verkade hålla med. Hon lade också till att det finns ju så många sätt som man faktiskt kan minska antalet AIDS-smittade i världen på, och speciellt då i utvecklingsländerna – kvinnor kan ju faktiskt lära sig att säga nej till sex! proklamerade hon. Då verkade det inte som om representanten från Läkare Utan Gränser kunde hålla tyst längre; hon sade det som jag hoppas att de flesta lyssnare faktiskt satt och tänkte: vad har utvecklingsländerna för kapacitet och prioritet att lägga på AIDS-smittade idag, egentligen? Deras prioritet är väl ändå mat, vatten, fred, utbildning och… ja.. där nånstans börjar väl listan… Om de nu skulle kunna klara av dessa saker utan bistånd, så kanske vårt svenska bistånd skulle kunna gå till enbart AIDS-bekämpning, men eftersom moderaterna har sänkt biståndet sedan de kom till makten så skulle det vara intressant att höra hur vår moderata biståndsminister hade tänkt sig att de skulle lägga fler resurser på AIDS-bekämpningen?? Ja, jag fick inte detta ur huvudet på hela dagen. Det gick liksom inte ihop i min lilla hjärna.

Så under 19-nyheterna på TV4 gjordes ett ganska kort inslag om att det idag var Internationella AIDS-dagen. Jag lovar att det gick de flesta förbi! Och så bor vi i Sverige – ett av världens bästa länder, om inte det bästa! Kunde de åtminstone inflikt ett postgiro-nummer som det går att ringa in pengar till? Eller ett SMS-nummer man kunde ringa för någon insamling? Jag menar – vi ringer och röstas på IDOL eller Stjärnor på Is varje vecka! Undra hur mycket pengar som ramlar in varje helg – och då är sändningarna ändå fullspäckade med reklam… Hur som helst! Direkt efter detta kommer ett inslag med the Killers. De har släppt en ny platta. Detta inslaget är mycket längre än det om Internationella AIDS-dagen. Hur kan det få vara så här? Man kanske tror att folk inte bryr sig om utvecklingsländerna över huvudtaget – men är det för att vi inte låter dem göra det? Om inte de som styr TV-sändningarna gör det, så tvingas ju vi också i stort sett negligera denna händelse. Jag skämdes över Sverige idag. På riktigt.

Transforming the Policing in Northern Ireland

The Conflict

The roots of the problems in Northern Ireland “exacerbated by three decades of conflict” goes back to the very foundation of the state” and has “inevitably aggravated the divisions within Northern Ireland society” (Patten Report, §1.3-4, 1999:3). During this conflict “which saw 3,600 people killed and over 40,000 people injured … both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries assumed responsibility for the ‘policing’ of their own areas” (McEvoy, 2003:324) which “led to a development of “violent systems of informal justice” (McEvoy, 2003:322).

Violence has increased intolerance, mutual distrust between people of different tradition and disrespect for each other’s conviction and human rights. It has distorted both the RUC’s approach to policing and the community’s attitude to the policing of its streets and neighbourhoods. Policing cannot be fully effective when the police have to operate from fortified stations in armoured vehicles, and when police officers dare not tell their children what they do for a living for fear of attack from extremists from both sides…several police families ha[s] been burned out of their homes on local streets (Patten Report, §1.4, 1999:3).

Even though punishment attacks and violence did persist during the peace process era (McEvoy et al, 2002:8) and after the cease-fires in 1994; the violence was addressed and dealt with politically, through the signing of the “Good Friday Agreement” in Belfast, 1998. This Agreement “aspires to be the foundation of a new polity – a “new beginning” in the way social and political relations are articulated in this region. It explicitly creates a new constitutional framework and complex political institutions designed to reflect and implement it (Harvey 1999 in McEvoy et al, 2002:10)”. Due to the Agreement, a number of bodies were established in Northern Ireland “which impacted directly on criminal justice policy” (McEvoy and Mika, 2002:535). These bodies included a Human Rights Commission, Equality Commission, and a Sentence Review Commission. It also included “two bodies in particular [which] impacted directly upon the development of community-based restorative justice programmes as alternatives to paramilitary punishment attacks” (McEvoy and Mika, 2002:535). It was “an independent commission on policing … and a civil service led review of the criminal justice system (Criminal Justice Review 2000)” (McEvoy and Mika, 2002:535).

The recommendations made in the Criminal Justice Review reflect, according to McEvoy and Eriksson (2007), a “mindset which feared genuine community involvement and ownership in the process of justice”. This restrictive community involvement was according to them not very helpful “particularly when those communities might be ones traditionally alienated from state structures”. Instead, they argue that this led to a failure to “deliver a new vision of state/community partnership more appropriate to a society in post conflict transformation” (12-13).

The Independent Commission on Policing released the Patten Report in September 1999, in order to form “a new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole” (The Agreement, Chapter 9, §1, 1998). The Commission starts the Patten Report by claiming that it believes that the Good Friday Agreement “offers a truly historic opportunity for a new beginning” (§1.1, 1999:1). According to the Commission

[t]he tragedies of the past have left a deep and profoundly regrettable legacy of suffering. We must never forget those who have died or been injured, and their families. But we can best honour them through a fresh start, in which we firmly dedicate ourselves to the achievement of reconciliation, tolerance, and mutual trust, and to the protection and vindication of the human rights of all (Patten Report, §1.1, 1999:1).

In order to reach this “new beginning” in Northern Ireland, reform has been needed in many instances, there amongst “[j]udicial and legal reform, the reform of the police, courts, [and] prisons” (McEvoy, 2007). This, in combination with “related efforts to improve the capacity and standing of state justice” have become typical elements of the ‘transitional justice template’” (McEvoy, 2007). Several measures have been implemented during the transitional justice process; specific symbolic measures recommended in the Patten Report, and other important measures will be discussed in this report.

Symbolic Measures in the Patten Report

The Blue Book, was a report (endorsed by the IRA and Sinn Féin in 1998 – which came to have a great impact on a new and transformed Northern Ireland) about a “non-violent community based justice project based upon the principles of restorative justice” (Auld et al 1997 in McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:8), in which the authors already had recognized the importance of a reformed police service. The Independent Commission on Policing was to set out to elaborate upon this very subject in the Patten Report. It claims that the “failure in the past to find an acceptable democratic basis for the governance of Northern Ireland that accommodated the rights and aspirations of both the unionist and nationalist communities” has lead to a contentious policing – “because the polity itself has been contentious” (§1.3, 1999:2). In any liberal democracy there is a required consent for effective policing, but across the community it has been absent (§1.3, 1999:2). Therefore, the Patten Report suggests major changes to the policing in Northern Ireland; it recommends specific symbolic measures to be implemented – which will be discussed below.

When focusing on the symbolic measures in the Patten Report regarding the policing practice in Northern Ireland, one can say that the major problem the police have been facing is the issue of identification. Both in the past “when the police were subject to political control by the Unionist government at Stormont, and more recently in the period of direct rule from Westminster”; the police in Northern Ireland have been “identified by one section of the population not primarily as upholders of the law but as defenders of the state” (Patten Report, §1.3, 1999:2).

This identification of police and state is contrary to policing practice in the rest of the United Kingdom. It has left the police in an unenviable position, lamented by many police officers. In one political language they are the custodians of nationhood. In its rhetorical opposite they are the symbols of oppression. Policing therefore goes right to the heart of the sense of security and identity of both communities and, because of the differences between them, this seriously hampers the effectiveness of the police service in Northern Ireland (Patten Report, §1.3, 1999:2).

Due to the Royal Ulster Constabulary’s (RUC’s) (former police service of Northern Ireland formed in 1922) failed support in the Catholic community, because of its

role as a predominantly Unionist force perceived as defending the Union with Britain, harassment and intimidation, compelling allegations of collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries in the killing of Nationalists, involvement in covert shoot-to-kill operations and the lack of any credible accountability structures have all combined to ensure that such a relationship remains problematic (Weitzer 1995, O’Rawe and Moore 1997, McGarry & O’Leary 1999 in McEvoy et al, 2002:5).

Therefore, the Commission came up with a number of recommendations to make this local police service “community friendly” and more “responsive to local needs” (Patten Report, 1999, Chapter 7). According to the Patten Report: “[p]olicing should be a collective community responsibility”, that it should be “a partnership for community safety” (§1.16, 1999:8). At the same time it acknowledges that “this sort of policing is more difficult than policing the community” (§1.16, 1999:8). According to the Commission (which has acted upon their own knowledge and findings, and also upon different submissions and recommendations from many other important actors) it requires certain measures to be taken, and “[i]t requires an end to ‘us’ and ‘them’ concepts of policing” (§1.16, 1999:8).

First, the Patten Report recommended several measures to be taken in order for this new policing practice to be effective – for the ‘us’ and ‘them’ policing practice to come to and end. On the issue of symbolic measures, it makes recommendations regarding changing the name, badge and symbols of the Northern Ireland police. The Commission argues that changing these are an important milestone for a more effective policing practice because

[m]any people in Northern Ireland from the Irish nationalist and republican tradition regard the name, badge and symbols of the Royal Ulster Constabulary as associating the police with the British constitution and state. This contributes to the perception that the police are not their police…The problem is that the name of the RUC, and to some extent the badge and the uniform too, have become politicised – one community effectively claiming ownership of the name of “our” police force, and the other community taking the position that the name is symbolic of a relationship between the police and unionism and the British state. The argument about symbols is not an argument about policing, but an argument about the constitution (Patten Report, §17.4, 1999:98-99).

“[T]he opportunity for a new beginning to policing Northern Ireland with a police service capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole” cannot, according to the Commission, be achieved “unless the reality that part of the community feels unable to identify with the present name and symbols associated with the police is addressed” (Patten Report, §17.6, 1999:99). Therefore, the Commissions proposals “seek to achieve a situation in which people can be British, Irish or Northern Irish, as they wish, and all regard the police service as their own” (Patten Report, §17.6, 1999:99).

In order for this to take place, the Commission “have not accepted the argument that the Royal Ulster Constabulary should be disbanded”, but it recommends that it should change its name, and “henceforth be named the Northern Ireland Police Service” (Patten Report, §17.6, 1999:99) (later changed to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) by the Government in order to avoid the shortened version “NIPS”). When it comes to other symbolic measures, the Commission further recommends:

• That the Northern Ireland Police Service adopt a new badge and symbols which are entirely free from any association with either the British or Irish states
• That the Union flag should no longer be flown from police buildings
• That, on those occasions on which it is appropriate to fly a flag on police buildings, the flag flown should be that of the Northern Ireland Police Service and it, too, should be free from association with the British or Irish states” (Patten Report, §17.6, page 1999:99).

Further, the Commission also thought it was important that “the link between the RUC and the new Northern Ireland Police Service be recognized” so it “recommend[s] that the colour of the current police uniform be retained” (Patten Report, §17.7, 1999:99).

There were several conflicting views regarding these symbolic measures that the Patten Report recommended to be implemented in order for the new police service to be fully effective. The new name and the design of the new badge was a debated issue for a long period of time. The debates and conflicting views regarding the new name and design of the badge will be discussed in the next chapter, but it was finally decided in the Statutory Rule 2002 No. 23 that the PSNI badge should feature the St. Patrick's saltire, and six symbols representing different and shared traditions:

• The Scales of Justice (representing equality and justice)
• The harp (a traditional Irish symbol but not the Brian Boru harp used as official emblem in the Republic)
• A torch (representing enlightenment and a new beginning)
• An olive branch (a peace symbol from Ancient Greece)
• A shamrock (a traditional Irish symbol, used by St Patrick, patron saint of all Ireland, to explain the Christian Trinity)
• A crown (a traditional symbol of monarchy but not the Crown worn by or representing the British Sovereign)

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_Service_of_Northern_Ireland).

Implementation of the Patten Report measures

As mentioned earlier, there were several conflicting reactions from different groups in Northern Ireland to the Commissions recommendations regarding symbolic measures in the Patten Report. The issues of the official symbols associated with the police service evoke different emotions for different people; it was very problematic to finally reach a conclusion in this matter.

For example, before the Patten Report was even released, Ulster Unionist Party leader, David Trimble said to BBC News, on Saturday August 28, 1999 that “[t]he symbolic changes, particularly to the honoured name of the existing service, are a savage repudiation of the present force, the people in it and those who have served and sacrificed for the community”. The Commission makes clear that they are conscious of the possibility that its recommendations “may be seen as some sort of repudiation of the sacrifice and service of thousands of RUC officers who have not only performed their duties with professionalism and fortitude but who have also faced … death and injury” but the Patten Report states that “such a view would be profoundly mistaken” (§17.7, 1999:99). It does not recommend the disbandment of RUC – since it would be impractical – but explains that its recommendations “are designed to achieve a transformation of policing in Northern Ireland to meet the requirements agreed by the parties to the Agreement and endorsed by the people of Northern Ireland in a referendum” (§17.7, 1999:99).

During the debates in the UK Parliament, voices from Northern Ireland were saying that the argument to change the name and badge, without disbanding the RUC was “unambiguous and unqualified” (UK Parliament Publications). However, they accepted the Governments preferred name and said that “[m]ost people in Northern Ireland accept the need for the change of name, although they may not agree with it. If people are asked if they agree, they will say no; but if it is there, they will accept it”, because “a growing number of people in the communities and in the police know that change, both symbolic and structural, is needed and that the police should be known by a name other than the RUC” (UK Parliament Publications).

Conservative Englishmen in the Parliament found this Patten proposal the most controversial proposal of the entire report, since they didn’t find any justification for it. It was argued that since the Belfast Agreement clearly accepts Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as a part of the United Kingdom; the police service should be associated with the symbols of the state and the name of the police service should entail a royal title. It was claimed that all evidence gathered around this issue proves that it “will cause major offence in the Protestant community but will not lead to significant improvements in support for the Police among Catholics” (UK Parliament Publications) - hence to one of the police authority's most recent surveys. It was also argued that according to an opinion poll in the Belfast Telegraph in April, sixty percent of Catholics in Northern Ireland had no difficulty with the name of the RUC. Last, in regard to the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee examination of the issue two years ago, the name should be kept. (UK Parliament Publications).

The Presbyterian Church and Government Committee in Ireland acknowledged in The Patten Report Dilemmas and Decisions; a Presbyterian Response from the Church and Government Committee that “symbols are very sensitive to both sections of the community” because of our “particular historical perspectives”. They pointed to the dilemmas faced when creating new symbols by affirming the need for new symbols that represents diversity but at the same time not eliminating the British Unionist identity, in order to create effective policing.

Regarding the Patten Reports suggestions of changing the badge of the police service, the BBC reported on Monday, November 19, 2001, that

[u]nionists have rejected the emblems for the new Police Service of Northern Ireland on the day seven different ideas for designs were published. The designs use symbols including the flax flower - symbolic of Northern Ireland's history as a linen producer - a bridge and a star. There is also a heraldic shield design and a St Patrick's Cross emblem. Neither the crown nor harp used in the old Royal Ulster Constabulary badge are included. In a letter to the Policing Board, Northern Ireland Security Minister Jane Kennedy said the designs had been drawn up ‘to assist the board in their consideration of this important matter’. She added: ‘The designs by no means cover all the possibilities. ‘The board may well have ideas of their own’.

Ulster Unionist peer Lord Kilclooney of Armagh (John Taylor) said as a member of the Policing Board he had been treated with contempt by the secretary of state, that the secretary of state had pre-empted them and that he had made it impossible for the board to reach any agreement on this subject (BBC News, 2001). According to Lord Kilclooney “none of the design ideas were acceptable and ran contrary to the Good Friday Agreement” and the Democratic Unionist Party's Ian Paisley Junior called all the designs “meaningless” while claiming that

we have very good symbols as it exists - we have the harp, the crown and indeed the shamrock … But all those things are now considered not acceptable and we have the complete ruination of anything British or anything which links the police service to the British connection (BBC News, 2001).

On the other hand,

Sinn Fein North Belfast assembly member Gerry Kelly said: ‘The Patten Report was very clear and unambiguous on this issue. It said: That the Northern Ireland Police Service adopt a new badge and symbols which are entirely free from any association with either the British or Irish states ... that the Union flag should no longer be flown from police buildings. The British Government should have dealt with this issue last year when it published the legislation. Despite the unnecessary delay around this issue it should now do so’ … Sinn Fein will make a submission to the British Government on this issue and our benchmark will be the Patten Report recommendations (BBC news, 2001).

However, “[t]he Government has been extremely active in helping to lay the foundations for these new policing arrangements as set out in the Patten Report and has taken two major Police Acts through Parliament since then” (Northern Ireland Office). Specifically, regarding the name change of the police force, it is stated in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 that “(1) The body of constables known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary shall continue in being as the Police Service of Northern Ireland (incorporating the Royal Ulster Constabulary)” (Chapter 32 §1). Regarding the Regulations as to the emblems and flags it is stated in the same act that

(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations (a) prescribing the design of an emblem for the police; and (b) regulating the use of that or any other emblem (i) on equipment or property used for the purposes of the police; or (ii) otherwise in connection with the police … (2) The Secretary of State may make regulations (a) prescribing the design of a flag for the police; and (b) regulating the flying or carrying of that or any other flag (i) on land or buildings used for the purposes of the police; or (ii) otherwise in connection with the police. (3) Before making any regulations under this section the Secretary of State shall consult (a) the Board; (b) the Chief Constable; (c) the Police Association; and (d) any other person or body appearing to him to have an interest in the matter (Chapter 32 §54).

Also, about the identification of police officers, the act explains that

(1) The Chief Constable shall make arrangements for each police officer to be assigned a serial number. (2) The Chief Constable shall ensure that, as far as practicable, the number assigned under this section to a police officer is so displayed on his uniform as to be clearly visible at all times when he is on duty and in uniform (Chapter 32 § 55).

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission sent a Briefing Note for the Committee Stage in the House of Commons regarding the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, on June 9, 2000. On the issues of symbols it said:

In responding to Patten, we noted that the NIHRC’s focus on international human rights law leads us to affirm that substantive change which would ensure human rights protection in the future is much more important than symbolic change. However, symbolic change should not be dismissed as being unimportant to human rights and the rule of law. We also noted in our response to Patten that “[t]o implement the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina the UN-appointed Office of the High Representative issued an order requiring ‘immediate display and use of common insignia and symbols of a neutral or inoffensive nature, including but not limited to uniform badges, patches, belt buckles, flags, coats-of-arms and administrative seals and stamps’”. We see that the draft legislation gives the Secretary of State the power to decide on the name of the police service (clause 69 (3)) and the design of the new badge and symbols (clause 50). We agree with the Patten Report that a new badge and a special flag should be adopted to symbolise the new beginning to policing in Northern Ireland…The NIHRC is conscious that the culture and ethos of a police service derive from much more than its name or symbols. We hope that the service’s Code of Ethics, and its day-to-day administration, will genuinely reflect both cultural diversity and an ethos of openness, fairness, understanding and helpfulness.

The weekend before the new Police Service of Northern Ireland came into operation - Danny Kennedy, Ulster Unionist MLA talks to BBC about the new era for policing in Northern Ireland. He says that

I think a lot of people will be very sad and very sorry that the proud symbols of the RUC are changing… Patten made huge mistakes in recommending changes to the names and symbols of the RUC. Many unionists will not accept that the current symbols of the RUC would not be able to command cross-community support (BBC News, 2001)

BBC also interviewed Alex Maskey, Sinn Fein MLA the weekend before the new changes were to be implemented, and he says that

I understand that there are unionists who feel aggrieved by the changes to policing. They have seen the RUC as their police force and there are key historical reasons for that. But many in the unionist community have been in denial that the RUC have been a problem. It is a fact that cannot be brushed under the carpet. The Patten report made clear that the new beginning to policing heralded by the Good Friday Agreement must mean a neutralisation of all symbols and emblems. There is a substantial size of the community which does not identify with certain symbols and emblems and the crown is one of them. I believe most nationalists will continue to withhold their support for the police service (BBC News, 2001).

Despite these disagreements over the symbolic measures, “a new name, badge and uniform came into being. In November 2001 the RUC became the Police Service of Northern Ireland” (PSNI). All ethno-religious groups today support the PSNI. The police emblems and the flags regulations were adopted January 24, 2002. The regulations were then approved by Parliament. On April 5, 2002 the police emblems and flags regulations came into operation and the new badge was taken into use for the Police Service of Northern Ireland. (Statutory Rule, 2002).

Other measures and their implementation

The Commission set out to find the necessary measures and gathered both oral and written evidence which served as a base for their suggestions regarding policing in Northern Ireland. Due to the new policing style based on community partnership and cooperation that the Commission ser out to create through the Patten Report, it recommended measures to be taken in regard to the look of police stations, police vehicles and police firearms. For example, it found that “[m]ost people across the communities would like to see a less “military” style of policing, without armoured cars and fortified police stations, and with less weaponry and smaller patrols” (§3.18, 1999:16). Therefore the Commission recommend that “police cars continue to be substituted as patrol vehicles in place of armoured Landrovers, and that the use of armoured Landrovers be limited to threatening situations” (§8.8, 1999:47) and “welcome the gradual withdrawal of long arms from police patrols in most parts of Northern Ireland” (§8.19, 1999:50).The Commission recommends that the police be equipped with “a broader range of public order equipment than the RUC currently possess, so that a commander has a number of options at his or her disposal which might reduce reliance on, or defer resort to, the PBR [(Plastic Baton Rounds)]” (§9.15, 1999:55) and ”[w]herever possible, video camera recordings should be made of incidents in which the use of PBRs is authorised” (§9.17, 1999:56).

Further, the Royal Ulster Constabulary was not a representative police service. Since the RUC was established, “the composition of the police has been disproportionately Protestant and unionist” (Patten Report, §1.3, 1999:2). This unequal composition regarding not only religion, but also ethnicity and gender, has lead to increasing problems in Northern Ireland. At the time the Patten Report was released, out of a forty percent Roman Catholic population in Northern Ireland, there was only about eight percent Roman Catholics in the police service, and only about twelve and a half percent of the force was women. (§14.1, 1999:81).

The fact that the RUC was widely recognized as white and male made the Commission find “broad acceptance across the communities, albeit with differences of emphasis, that the composition of the police service should be more representative of the population, in particular that there should be more Catholic and women officers” (§3.23, 1999:17). “[It] also received submissions arguing that there should be more officers from ethnic minorities, more gay and lesbian officers, and more officers from ‘working class’ backgrounds” (§14.1, 1999:81). Not only did the Commission opt for gays and lesbians to join the police service to a larger extent, but “[it] opted for a recruitment profile of fifty percent Protestant, fifty percent Catholic over a ten year period” so that “the composition of the police should continue to move towards a closer resemblance to that of the community as a whole” (§14.11, 1999:83). In regard to the imbalance of religion, ethnicity and gender, a section in the Criminal Justice Review explains that “[t]he attainment of a workforce that is, at all levels, and in its constituent agencies, broadly reflective of the community in Northern Ireland…is an objective for the criminal justice system which we strongly endorse.” (CJR Para 3.35)” (McEvoy et al, 2002:12).

Another important measure that the Patten Report discussed was on the issue of accountability. The commission proposed that “members of the policing team should serve at least three and preferably five years in the same neighbourhood” and “wear their names clearly displayed on their uniforms, and that their uniforms should also bear the name of the locality for which they are responsible” (§7.13, 1999:44). It further recommended that “where practicable, policing teams should patrol on foot” (§7.13, 1999:44). Also, according to the Commission “the police must be fully accountable for public order policing as for any other aspect of their work... the police in riot gear should be capable of being identified”. Therefore, the Commission recommends that “officers’ identification numbers should be clearly visible on their protective clothing, just as they should be on regular uniforms” (§9.18, 1999:56).

In order to achieve democratic accountability, the Commission recommends “that an entirely new Policing Board be created, to replace the present Police Authority” (§6.2, 1999:28). In addition, when it comes to legal accountability, “there should be a complaints tribunal, comprising senior members of the legal profession, with full powers to investigate cases referred to it (either directly or through the Police Ombudsman) involving covert law enforcement operations (§6.45, 1999:39).

There were other measures recommended by the Patten Report regarding such issues as human rights approach, the army’s role, police resources and the civilianisation of the police. A “comprehensive programme of action to focus policing in Northern Ireland on a human rights-based approach” (§4.6, 1999:20) is welcomed by the Commission. It also welcomes “the reduction of the army’s role and [it] recommend[s] that it should continue to be reduced, as quickly as the security situation will allow, so that the police can patrol all parts of Northern Ireland without military support” (§8.11, 1999:48). The Commission agreed and further recommended that “all suspects should in future be detained in custody suites based in police stations” (§8.15, 1999:49). The Commission also recommends “recruitment of more officers into the part-time reserve, particularly from communities that are currently under-represented in the police. The main purpose of this is to strengthen police connections with local communities” (§9.6, 1999:52). Regarding civilianisation of the police, the Commission have recommended “the civilianisation of as many as 1,000 jobs now being done by police officers” (§13.8, 1999:77).

Last, but not least, the commission recommends that “community awareness training for police recruits be developed to include representatives of all the main political and religious tradition in Northern Ireland” (§16.17, 1999:94-95). Because “[p]eople from each of the main communities should have ample opportunity to learn about the history, traditions and outlook of the other (§16.17, 1999:94-95. Also, “[t]hose wishing to learn the Irish language, and for that matter other languages, should be helped to do so. Racism awareness and awareness of the concerns of the gay and lesbian community should also be part of community awareness training” (§16-17, 1999:94-95).

The British Government (operating under Peter Mandelson who was the Secretary of State at the time), introduced a Police Bill after the Patten Report “which was designed to give effect to the report’s recommendations” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:14). Mandelson has been accused of diluting and gutting the Report (see “Perfidious Britania” by Brendan O’Leary, in The Guardian 15^th June 2000) in such a way that the

envisaged powers of the police board were dramatically curtailed, the centrality of human rights down-played, the Police Ombudspersons’ powers were reduced and much of the detail on training, ethos, restriction, decentralisation etc were to be left to an ‘Implementation Plan’ which was to be left in the hands of the Northern Ireland Office and the RUC Chief Constable (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:13).

Finally the government came up with an updated implementation plan (NIO 2001) during the political negotiations in Weston Park 2001, and “additional legislation was agreed which eventually resulted in the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2003”. (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:15). Due to these changes, SDLP “took up their seats on the Policing Board” in November 2001 when it was established, and on the “local policing partnership boards when these came on line in 2003” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:15). But Sinn Féin “refused to endorse these changes” while arguing that the government had not done enough ”in regard to implementing the full Patten Report, and that the SDLP ‘jumped too early’ and that they ‘accepted half a loaf’ on policing, thereby breaking the nationalist consensus on maximising change to the policing establishment” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:15). And the SDLP argued that Sinn Féin were “yelping on the sidelines” and that they did not have “…the political courage and capacity to make policing work” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:15). “This wrangle within Irish nationalism in Northern Ireland has continued to flavour the political debate on the development of community based on restorative justice until the present day” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:15). According to McEvoy and Eriksson (2007), “[w]hat has arguably shifted the debate in both communities, apart from Sinn Fein’s recent endorsement of policing, has been the consistently high-quality of the work and the willingness of both sets of projects to commit themselves to external evaluation and regulation” (18-19).

Today, “[t]he accountability structures including the Policing Board, the Police Ombudsman's Office and the 29 District Policing Partnerships are all in place. Kathy O’Toole the former Patten Commissioner has said that the Police Service of Northern Ireland is now the most accountable Police Service in the world” (PSNI).

Regarding the 50:50 arrangements for the recruitment of Catholic and non-Catholics, on March 5, 2008, the Northern Ireland Government explains that it is “on course to reach its target of achieving thirty percent Catholic composition within the PSNI by 2010/2011” (Northern Ireland Office). An emerging more representative police service has been seen over the last few years. The number of full time Catholic police officers has increased “from 8.3% in 1998 to 23.71% in February 2008” (Northern Ireland Office). During the first thirteen competitions concerning joining the PSNI, about eighty thousand applications was received “from across the whole community” (Northern Ireland Office). This proves the fact that “there is a new generation who are ready to commit to a career in PSNI” and it “emphasises that confidence in our new policing structures is rising” (Northern Ireland Office).

“Mika (2006:23) argues that Community Restorative Justice Ireland was successfully intervening in 94% of potential paramilitary assaults in their operational areas and Northern Ireland Alternatives in 90% by the end of 2005” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:10). The Justice Oversight Commissioner and the International Monitoring Commission gave a real positive response to these [community restorative justice] projects. (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:21). (Northern Ireland Alternatives and Community Restorative Justice both agreed upon the government protocol in the spring of 2007). (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:23).

The success of the projects in not only surviving on an initially hostile political climate, but actually developing highly professional and impactive services to violence affected communities and ultimately persuading sufficient numbers of wary criminal justice professionals and more open-minded politicians of their bona fides is quite remarkable (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:23).

Conclusion: The role of Symbolic measures in the NI transition

“To remove the causes of violence, political change is required that removes whatever actual barriers exist to the incorporation of all citizens and, as important, wins their allegiance to the state” (Galtung 1996 in McEvoy et al, 2002:10).

Northern Ireland has been facing problems since the state was founded in 1920. These deep rooted problems evoke violent conflicts during the last three decades on the 20^th century. These conflicts “produced a state system which privileged control over justice and security, which eschewed any meaningful community control or accountability over such functions, and which was directly challenged by the violent activities of paramilitaries” (McEvoy and Eriksson 2007:8). Since the ceasefire in August 1994 and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, Northern Ireland entered a transitional phase; it was (through the Independent Commission on Policing) able to focus on “establishing the relationship between various communities and the police” (McEvoy at al, 2002:15) .To do this, several measures were taken in order for this transition to function and bring about peaceful communities. “Clearly the inability of the RUC to move around Republican\Nationalist areas unless heavily armed, in armored vehicles, with army support and often a helicopter presence has inhibited traditional ‘community policing’” (McEvoy et al, 2002:6).

When people realize that “an all powerful state” no longer can “provide all their security needs”; “they are obliged to work in active partnership with the police, private security and their neighbours” (Garland 1996 in McEvoy et al 2002:20). Within this paradigm of police\community relations, policing is not something done to the community but rather as a matter of “collective responsibility, a partnership for community safety” (Patten Report, §1.7, 1999:4) with the police having certain professional functions within a network of agencies, groups and individuals at local community level” (McEvoy et al, 2002:15).

The role, practice and policy of the police service have been central to the conflicts experienced. Therefore, establishing symbolic measures in regard to the security/policing agenda has been critical attempts for peacekeeping in this divided society. The problems with policing practice in Northern Ireland have in the past been very closely related to the issue of identity/identification. The former police service (RUC) was either seen as “custodians of nationhood” or as “symbols of oppression”, depending on what political/religious/ethnic loyalty one holds. The fact that the composition of the RUC since it was established in 1922 disproportionately has been Protestant and Unionist is an important factor in regard to implementation of symbolic measures in the Northern Ireland transitional phase. (Patten Report, §1.3, 1999:2).

When the Patten Report (1999) released its recommendations regarding a number of symbolic measures to be taken in order to implement a new policing practice, several different responses followed. There was a strong opposition from the Protestant/Unionists/Loyalist about changing the name, the symbols and the uniforms of the RUC, while the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican mainly affirmed the proposition made by the Independent Commission on Policing. Although, at first it did demand a complete disbandment of the police force, and said that it was willing to change “when the political climate allowed it to do so” (O’Rawe, 2007:13-14). There was even a ‘Save Our RUC’ campaign where public representatives said that “the ninety-two protestant force should remember who it owed its allegiance to” (O’Rawe, 2007:13-14). These kinds of reactions that followed the Patten Report enhanced the alienation between the two communities.

O´Rawe (2007) talks about diverse opinions and explains that

[p]articularly in the initial stages of any peace process, there can often be huge resistance to even the idea of change among those who have policed and governed during the period of conflict and those ethno religious groups in whose favour the state apparatus has operated or been perceived to operate. In Northern Ireland this played out in articulations by many in the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist communities of ownership of and identification with the police (13).

Since a reformation of the security sector changes the power relations; the symbolic measures suggested by the Patten Report was strongly resisted by the powerful ethno religious community, since they managed the security/policing in the past. According to O´Rawe (2007): “[t]hey will fight to reassert power in the fluidity of transitional processes – and are likely to stamp their identity all over the reform agenda” (16). However, gradually the dominant ethno-religious community changed from being completely opposed to change, to publically accept the need to let more Catholics join the proposed 50:50 police service by the Patten Report. (O’Rawe, 2007:13-14).

So one can conclude that “the further Northern Ireland society moves from the realities of a daily political conflict, the more former combatants merge into what is a diverse and vibrant community sector” (McEvoy and Mika., 2002:546). McEvoy and Mika (2002) argues that when it comes to the civil society, where community restorative justice programmes are based; they are going to be “more successful” in places where the community sector is “organized and dynamic” (548). The research on the Northern Ireland’s “different community types” suggests that “areas with the highest levels of crime victimization and socio-economic deprivation often also have high levels of engagement in local civic, church and other ‘community’-related activities” (O’Mahony et al, 2000 in McEvoy and Mika, 2002:548-549). Morison (2001) has characterized Northern Irelands community-sector as “being the most diverse and active in the United Kingdom” (McEvoy and Mika, 2002:549). One can therefore argue that “it is the energy, commitment and enthusiasms of local activists that drives any successful community-based project”, but that it also has to have elements of ”organization, direction and the commitment to non-exclusionary practices” along with a “development of indigenous standards of practice based on internationally recognized human rights standards” (McEvoy and Mika, 2002:549). These human rights standards should not be imposed by the state as the Criminal Justice Review (2000) suggests, but instead be internalized by the communities themselves (McEvoy and Mika, 2002:550).

According to the Northern Ireland Government

[t]he face of policing in Northern Ireland has changed dramatically over recent years. A new name, new uniform, new recruits and new oversight arrangements have all helped transform policing…The Government has been extremely active in helping to lay the foundations for these new policing arrangements as set out in the Patten Report and has taken two major Police Acts through Parliament since then. Developing a police service that is more effective and representative of the community it serves, and which obtains the confidence and support it needs, has been the Government’s aim throughout the change process. Among the first series of changes was the establishment in November 2001 of a Policing Board, with nationalist participation and extensive powers to hold the police to account. The RUC was renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), and a new badge for the service was unanimously agreed by the Policing Board. The first recruits, appointed under the 50:50 arrangements for the recruitment of Catholic and non-Catholics, began graduating in April 2002. And the creation of District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) across Northern Ireland in 2003 has given local people a stake in policing. The Oversight Commissioner has regularly reported on these reforms which have been described as the ‘most comprehensive change programme ever embarked upon by a police service anywhere in the world’. Together with the office of the Police Ombudsman which deals with complaints about police conduct, Northern Ireland has one of the most rigorous systems of independent civilian oversight of policing in the world (Northern Ireland Office).

Bibliography

The Agreement. (1998). http://www.nio.gov.uk/agreement.pdf

Auld et al. (1997). Designing a System of Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland. Belfast: The Authors.

BBC News. (1999). “UK: Northern Ireland; Flanagan Concerned about Patten Report”. August 28. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/432319.stm

BBC News. (2001). “Unionists Reject Police Badge Design”. November 19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/1664681.stm

Harvey, C. (1999) “Legality, Legitimacy and Democratic Renewal : The New Assembly in Context.” Fordham International Law Journal, 22, 4, 1389-1415.

Galtung, J. (1996) Peace by Peaceful Means : Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization. London : Sage.

Garland, D. (1996). “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society.” British Journal of Criminology 36, 1 445-471.

McEvoy, K., and H. Mika, H. (2002) “Restorative Justice and the Critique of Informalism in Northern Ireland”, British Journal of Criminology, vol. 42, no 3, pp. 534-562.

McEvoy, K. (2003). “Beyond the Metaphor: Political Violence, Human Rights and ‘New’ Peacemaking Criminology”, Theoretical Criminology, vol. 7, mo. 3, pp. 319-346.

McEvoy, K and A Eriksson. (2007). ‘Who Owns Justice?: Community, State and the Northern Ireland Transition’ in J. Shapland (ed), Justice Community and Civil Society. Cullompten: Willan.

McEvoy et al. (2002). ‘Conflict, Crime Control, and the 're'-Construction of State-Community Relations in Northern Ireland in G. Hughes, E. McLaughlin, and J. Muncie (eds.) Crime, Prevention and Community Safety. New Directions. London: Sage.

Mika, H. (2006). Community Based Restorative Justice in Northern Ireland: An Evaluation. Belfast: Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queens University Belfast.

Morison, J. (2001). ‘Democracy, Governance and Governmentality: Civic Public Space and Constitutional Renewal in Northern Ireland’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 21/2: 287-310.

Northern Ireland Office (NIO). (2001). The Community and the Police Service: Patten Report Updated Implementation Plan. Belfast: Northern Ireland Office.

Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. (2000). Police (NI) Bill 2000: Briefing Note for the Committee Stage in the House of Commons. June 9.

O’Rawe, M. (2007). Security Sector Reform and Identity in Divided Societies.

O’Rawe, M. & L. Moore (1997) Human Rights On Duty : Principles for Better Policing, International Lessons for Northern Ireland. Belfast : CAJ.

O’Mahony et al. (2000). Crime Community and Locale. The Northern Ireland Communities Crime Survey. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Patten, C. (1999) Report of an Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland. Belfast: HMSO.

Presbyterian Church Ireland. The Patten Report Dilemmas and Decisions; A Presbyterian Response from the Church and Government Committee. http://www.presbyterianireland.org/pdfs/patten.response.pdf

O’Leary, B. (2000). “Perfidious Britania”, in The Guardian. June, 15.

Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000. Chapter 32. http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts2000/ukpga_20000032_en_1

Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). http://www.psni.police.uk/index/about_psni.htm

Statutory Rule. (2002). Police Emblems and Flags Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2002. No. 23.

http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Sr/sr2002/20020023.htm

UK Parliament Publications. Publications and Records; Police (Northern Ireland) Bill. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmstand/b/st000706/pm/00706s02.htm

Weitzer, R. (1995) Policing Under Fire : Ethnic Conflict and Police Community Relations in Northern Ireland. Albany : State university of New York Press.

McGarry, J & B. O’Leary (1999) Policing Northern Ireland : Proposals for a New Start. Belfast: Blackstaff.

Wikipedia for description of the new emblem in detail. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Police_Service_of_Northern_Ireland

Torsdag – dagen efter dagen mitt emellan

Vaknar up alldeles försent; hinner inte äta frukost med Matthew. Hjälper honom packa ner två egg-biscuits, en mugg kaffe med half&half och socker samt en grön gatorade i en brun papperspåse innan han åker iväg. Gör sedan iordning lite havregrynsgröt och kaffe till mej själv, och sätter mej framför tv:n och tittar på morgonnyheterna till frukosten istället. Det kanske jag inte skulle ha gjort; nyheter gör mig ofta väldigt upprörd på många olika sätt. Idag kan jag inte komma ifrån att uppröras över hur länder forsätter att vara så ytliga och så bra på att prioritera fel saker.

Idag har Bush beslutat att lägga in sitt veto, så att barn i USA inte får extra hjälp från the Government med sjukvård. Han håller fast vid att sjukvård bör vara privat, och vill inte att sjukvården skall bli mer ”socialicerad”, trots att miljontals familjer inte har råd med privat sjukvård.

Nästa inslag avslöjar att USA skall skänka olja värd 25 miljoner dollar till Nordkorea. (!). En utav republikanerna som har varit med och beslutat om detta finansiella bidrag förklarar att: ”In order to get something in this world - you have to give something”… Kanske hade det varit bättre om de 25 miljoner dollarna (för olja är en lyxvara idag; vi vet alla att den kommer ta slut inom en inte alltför lång framtid) hade satsats på sjukvård för barn?

Utrikespolitik är viktig. Men varför fortsätter USA att slösa på sina resurser på icke godtagbara ändamål utomlands? Hade Irak-kriget fortskridit annorlunda (givetvis borde det inte ens initierats) hade mycket mer resurser kunnat läggas på uppbyggnad av landet och av folket, och även till internationell humanitär hjälp. Krig och mutor går bort 2007. Vi borde kunna tänka annorlunda.

Nyhetsankaret byter ämne. Till Californien. Där har myndigheterna påbörjat någon slags raid mot illegala invandrare - de som är Hollywoods apelsinplockare och vindruvsplockare, de är deras house-cleaners, barnskötare, trädgårdsmästare. De står och köar vid vägkanten utmed La Brea (om jag inte minns fel var det La Brea) varje dag för att se om någon skulle vilja plocka upp dem och ge dem ett dagsverke. De säljer apelsiner utmed vägkanten. De gör i princip alla de jobb som ingen amerikan vill ha. De jobbar hårt. Och de är uppskattade just därför. De är den oförsäkrade illegala underklassen som byggt Kalifornien och som Kalifornien är så beroende av. Fortfarande. Jag ser detsamma i North Carolina där jag är just nu. Bara mexikaner som jobbar på tobaksplantagen åt de vita ranch/plantage ägarna.

Hur som helst: i dagarna så genomförs ett ”tough response to illigal immigration” i Kalifornien. En kvinna som är inblandad i processen kallar det ”the largest sweep of its kind”; 1300 illegala invandrare (från 32 länder) har arresterats och 600 har redan deporterats. Hon säger att immigranter idag bara kan ”slip into society”, men att “those days are no longer”…

Nästa inslag handlar skrattretande nog om Kaliforniens ökande booze-problem i ”wine country”! Vinodlarna är upprörda över att folk kommer fulla till deras vinprovningar. De säger att ”certain limo companies are bringing heavy intoxicated individuals” – men “we want them intoxicated by the beauty of the wine country and by their wine - not by the beers they have been drinking on the way from San Diego”.

Alienation.

Controversies.

Dubbel morals.

When will we begin to work together and understand eachothers values for real?

My thesis from the University of Malmö Spring 2007

Here is the link to my thesis (D-essay) regarding the paradox of Swedish War Materiel Export today.

http://www.svenskafreds.se/vapenexport/texter/

The Paradox of the Swedish War Materiel Industry

Major changes have occurred within the Swedish War Materiel Industry over the past decade. Sweden has transformed from being a truly neutral country, with uniquely restrictive war materiel exportation laws and policies, into being one of the ten largest exporters of war materiel in the world. Most of the manufactured war materiel in Sweden is now used for export. An increasing trend of export has made the Swedish War Materiel Trade Industry flourish.

On the front stage, towards the public, Sweden is upholding its image of being a neutral country. Its doctrine is the same as it has been since the beginning of the 1990s: that Sweden has restrictive arms trade politics. It is true that Sweden has strict laws and guidelines concerning war material trade; according to these, export of war materiel is not allowed to countries where extensive human rights violations occur. Neither is it allowed to countries in armed conflict, where there is a fear that an armed conflict will occur nor to a State with domestic armed disturbances/conflicts. Also, Swedish war materiel trade should never be in conflict with its foreign policy goals, which are enhancing Sweden’s contribution to freedom, security, democracy, prosperity, and sustainable development in the world.

Despite this, Swedish war materiel export has now reached the highest amount in Swedish history. Backstage, the view of export has changed and an export-oriented custom has taken hold. In the 1990s, Swedish war materiel production increased with an average of 5.5 percent every year. But over the past 4 years, the trend has increased drastically, especially due to the Iraq War. Since it broke out, the total export of war materiel has almost doubled. In 2006 it exceeded ten billion SEK, which means that during the past ten years, the Swedish arms trade industry has more than tripled – from three billion SEK per year to over ten billion SEK. Not only has Sweden increased its export of war materiel to the USA - in times of war - but also to countries where extensive violations of human rights occurs, for example India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Mexico, Thailand and Bahrain.

The front stage behaviour and the backstage action contradict each other. There is a difference in rhetoric and practice. It is a paradox to appear neutral front stage when exporting war materiel to ‘critical States’ backstage. Somehow Sweden has come to facilitate a climate that allows this to happen.

The reason for an increasing number of permissions of war materiel export being passed to countries that violate human rights or are engaged in armed conflicts is that there has been a shift of governmental responsibility and accountability regarding war trade. The many freedoms from historically stringent materiel export regulation were in 1996 given from the Parliament to an independent arms trade authority, called Inspection of Strategic Products (ISP). This authority is subject to neither the same restrictions nor accountability that the Parliament used to be. Since the Parliament is no longer held accountable to enforce war materiel trade and export laws, it is able to hide behind this new, separate authority. Because, when ISP violates the Swedish laws and guidelines about war materiel, and when it ignores and acts out of accordance with Swedish foreign policy goals – the Parliament claims that it cannot do anything about it, simply because it does not handle the issue. And once the decisions by ISP have been made, the Parliament is unable to change them. If ISP decides upon critical matters on their own – even if is it not supposed to - no one can be held responsible if unlawful decisions are made, because ISP’s decisions cannot be tried in court. Members of the cabinet cannot be responsible for them - not even ISP themselves. No decisions are made in EKR (where the director-general of ISP is the chairman); it only gives advice to ISP – which means that they can not be held responsible either. This has made it possible for open disputable war trade to take place in Sweden today - without any accountability or consequence.

It seems almost impossible for the Parliament to eliminate this backstage practice concerning increased export of war materiel to critical countries. Even if it is stated in §1a in Law (1992:1300) about War Materiel that the Parliament may submit regulations about handing over matters from the ISP to the Parliament - because of neutrality political aspects - any possible matter of this kind, which is already being processed at the authority, would not be encompassed by these regulations because the Swedish constitution does not allow the Parliament to interfere in decisions of authorities in separate matters (SOU 2005:9). During the critical time period of 2000-2003, ISP did not forward a single case to the Parliament. Since ISP did not make use of its contingency to hand over decisions to the Parliament, and since the Parliament is not allowed to “interfere in decisions of authorities in separate matters” according to the Swedish constitution – the Parliament has to really be on its toes to submit regulations about taking over matters from ISP before they are being processed.

So what does the future hold for Swedish War Materiel Trade? As shown, Sweden has been taking certain measures in making its politics regarding arms trade less restrictive over time, despite its very clear current and historic laws, guidelines, and foreign policy goals. It has created an authority which has made it easier for war materiel to be exported, despite earlier restrictions. It has engaged in international agreements with the other largest exporters of weapons in order to make this industry grow. Also, the Parliament has appointed a group (KRUT) to review the current laws and guidelines regarding war materiel, who suggests that the human rights aspect could be overlooked when decisions about exporting weapons are made, that the demand for democracy in recipient countries should be dismissed, that deeper military cooperation with the USA should be promoted, and that the general prohibition of export should be abolished.

If the Government agrees upon the newly suggested guidelines this year, it will obtain a less restrictive approach. It does not seem to be a new trend that the Parliament will use its possibility to intervene in ‘critical matters’. Instead, it is on the verge of creating a new precedent by developing the war materiel politics in a way that facilitates export to critical States. The incongruence between theory and practice – between the front and backstage – might not be able to uphold much longer. There are two options for Sweden. Either Sweden will loosen its export regulations to agree with the practice today – with the backstage behaviour – and adjust its policies to commercial needs and to our new partners of cooperation. Or it will embrace its foreign policy and make the War Materiel Industry agree with the goals of enhancing human rights, democracy, security, and sustainable development in the world.

Hu Jintao i Sverige

Så stod man där helt plötsligt och applåderade Kinas President i Frihamnen i Göteborg i lördags. Det fick mej att verkligen tänka till. Tyskarna applåderade Hitler. Nu vill jag inte jämföra Hu Jintao med Hitler, utan jag vill bara göra ett statement att det är lätt att ryckas med i en folkmassa då alla andra gör en och samma sak. Jag hade farit till Göteborg för att visa mitt amerikabesök staden samtidigt som Ostindiefararen seglade in i hamnen. Precis när vi stegade in och såg ”piratskeppet” förklarade Harald Treutiger att Kungen (Carl XVI Gustaf) skulle hålla ett välkomsttal för ostindeifararna. Så vi stannade och lyssnade. Sedan var det tydligen Hu Jintao’s tur att säga några väl valda ord. Själv var jag lite skymd och kunde inte se hela storbilds skärmen, men jag minns att Jintao pratade om att han ville stärka bandet mellan Sverige och Kina: ”Vi vill fortsätta att öka det politiska förtroendet och samarbetet” sade han. När han sade detta så ökade hans röst i styrka, han betonade orden lite extra och folket jublade och applåderade. Och jag märkte hur jag stämde in, om än motvilligt. Jag stämde ändå in.
Det som skapade min motvilja är följande: Kina ligger verkligen på efterkälken vad gäller kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter. Förutom att det i Kina förekommer tortyr och dödstraff, så har detta odemokratiska land verkligt krassa rättigheter för arbetare. Det är till exempel förbjudet att organisera sig i fria fackförbund, det är inte ovanligt att man jobbar 16 timmar om dagen i Kina – för endast några kronor i timmen. Enligt Amnesty förekommer det rapporter om fabriker där de anställda måste få tillstånd för att gå på toaletten och där farliga kemikalier hanteras utan skyddsutrustning. Detta är dock inte allt. En annan sak som väcker min motvilja till att applådera Jintao är saknaden av Kinas initiativ till att verka för en lösning av konflikterna i Darfur. Tvärtom så levererar både Ryssland och Kina vapen till Sudan idag. Kina och Sudan har idag ett ömsesidigt beroende, därför kan Kina hjälpa till att stoppa folkmordet i Darfur genom att sätta press på Khartoum för att försöka få fram en fredlig lösning.
Givetvis var Amnesty, såväl som andra människorättsorganisationer på plats för att protestera mot Hu Jintao’s besök i Göteborg i lördags. ”Det är ett bra tillfälle att demonstrera för mänskliga rättigheter i Kina. Om vi inte gör det när presidenten är på besök, när ska vi då göra det” sade Karolina Pontén, som representerade Amnesty.
Maud Olofsson lovade i Nyhetsmorgon TV4 att konfrontera Hu Jintao under lördagen i Stockholm. Hon sade till TT att hon kommer att ”berätta om betydelsen av en öppen ekonomi, en öppen ekonomi kräver demokrati och leder till att människor ställer krav på att de mänskliga rättigheterna följs. Vi kan visa det i Sverige”.
Nu vet jag inte vad som sades i diksussionerna med presidenten i Stockholm, men jag hoppas innerligt att representanterna för Sveriges regering verkligen trycker på hans arbete vad gäller mänskliga rättigheter, rättigheter för arbetare. Jag hoppas att representanterna för det svenska näringslivet gör som Volvos VD och koncernchef för Volvokoncernen Leif Johansson förklarade i Nyhetsmorgon då han sade att det är viktigt att investera och öka samarbetet med Kina då svenska företag kan vara föregångsländer där; svenska företag kan statuera bra exempel. (Det är absolut ett bra argument för att för fortsatta investeringar, men vet vi att det fungerar så i praktiken?). Det är ytterst viktigt att de Svenska företagen även ställer krav på deras underleverantörer så att vi kan hjälpa till att verka för miljö och arbetares rättigheter i Kina. Jag hoppas att Bildt och Reinfeldt verkligen pressade Jintao och utrikesminister Yang Jiechi till att stoppa vapenleveranser till Sudan, till att få Sudan att stoppa flygräder mot Darfur samt till att införa ekonomiska sanktioner mot Sudan om de fortsätter att jobba emot den internationella närvaron i Darfur.
Det var därför jag kunde motivera besöket av den förste kinesiske presidentens i Sverige någonsin. Jag inte kan komma ifrån att jag tycker att det är viktigt med dialog – inte isolering. Det är väldigt bra att Kina öppnar upp sig för dialog – om än långsamt – men trots detta måste Sverige försöka vara hårdare och börja ställa krav på Kina om vi skall ”fortsätta öka det politiska förtroendet och samarbetet” mellan våra länder. Huruvida det var rätt att applådera Hu Jintao eller inte är därför svårt att säga. Det kändes olustigt, och det kanske var en känsla som räddade mig. Jag tycker att det är väldigt väldigt mycket som kan bli bättre i Kina. Senast igår uppdagades det att till och med barnarbete förmodligen förekommit vid tillverkning av produkter till de kommande olympiska spelen i Peking. Det har dock skett en värdefull förändring utav Kinas öppenhet mot omvärlden på bara några decennier, och det är viktigt att det fortsätter i denna riktning. Men vi måste försöka öka takten ännu mer, och därför hoppas jag att de representanter för Sverige som träffade Hu Jintao i helgen verkligen yrkade på dessa punkter. Annars anser jag hans besök nästintill olustigt.